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“A Voice for the Last and Least”: Thirumavalavan and the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal 
Katchi in the Lok Sabha. 
 
 
Abstract 
Between 2009 and 2014, Thirumavalavan, the leader of the largest Dalit party in Tamil 
Nadu, served as an MP in Delhi. This paper draws on research with the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK or Liberation Panther Party) to raise a number of key questions 
about representation and democracy in a multi-level federal system. Although they are a 
minor party, their experience of national politics offers insights into the workings of party 
systems in India. The paper considers the extent to which they are constrained by alliance 
partners and political rules-of-the-game. It then considers the question of representation, and 
asks what the VCK managed to achieve in Thirumavalavan’s constituency of Chidambaram 
and the extent to which they could raise issues at the national level both through formal and 
disruptive means. Finally, the paper reflects on the advantages and disadvantages for a small 
party of having a foothold in the Centre and draws out the lessons of the VCK’s experience 
for our understanding of Indian politics. 
 
Keywords 
Federal Politics; Minor Parties; Coalition Politics; Tamil Nadu; Eelam 
 
Introduction 
The Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK or Liberation Panther Party) is one of innumerable 
small parties in India. The Panthers are Dalit-led and see Ambedkar as an inspiration, but this 
has not prevented them from adopting a regional focus, seen in the demand for a Tamil nation 
free of caste. This (sub)nationalist focus has caused controversy as VCK leader 
Thirumavalavan has been a vocal advocate of the fight for Tamil Eelam and consorted with 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) despite their proscription as a terrorist outfit in 
India. Indeed, when I met him at his MP’s residence in Delhi during fieldwork in 2012 this 
broader Tamil focus was immediately apparent: 
 
On the desk were a pile of letters, some files, and printed placards outs bearing the 
message ‘Manohan (sic) Singhji don’t let Rajabakshe (sic) come to India’ – and 
variants of that message. Thirumavalavan had been shouting down the Government in 
Parliament about training being offered to Lankan soldiers. Thirumavalavan came in 
and greeted me. He was due to head out straight away to see the new home minister 
Shinde - as it was his birthday - and offer him a bouquet of flowers. A DMK politician 
was due to take Thiruma along. Another politician had urged him to attend the Indian 
Parliamentary Group (IPG) dinner hosted by Meira Kumar. He was not in the group 
and had not received an invitation but the other politician was saying ‘come anyway’. 
… In the event, the DMK politician was held up in traffic and never came, and Thiruma 
spent the evening chatting to me (Fieldnotes, August 2012). 
 
Though the VCK are a minor party with marginal electoral returns, the election of a party MP 
to the Lok Sabha in 2009 amplified their importance. Encapsulated in my notes from the time 
are the concerns that I wish to address in this paper: firstly we see how becoming an MP 
opened up opportunities for networking and alliances with state and national leaders. 
Secondly, the placards speak to the over-riding focus of VCK politics during his tenure as an 
MP: the war in Sri Lanka and the treatment of Tamils during the conflict and to 
Thirumavalavan’s use of disruptive tactics to get his point across. Finally, the fact that the 
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various invitations came to nought speak to the continuing marginalisation of the VCK from 
the centres of power. 
 
Were we to measure the success of the VCK in electoral terms alone, looking at seats won 
and vote-share (2 Members of the Legislative Assembly and 1 Member of Parliament to 
date), we would regard them as a marginal organisation with minimal influence.1 Such 
analysis, however, would be overly narrow. While such indicators are clearly important for a 
political party, political recognition and impact extends beyond electoral results. Analysis of 
the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi, thus, needs to probe their interaction with, and possible 
effect on, other parties and changing social relations more generally. One of the aims of Dalit 
political engagement, after all, is to democratise Indian democracy (Gorringe 2017; 
Waghmore 2013). Herzog (1987: 317) argues that small or 'minor' parties are often 
considered to be unimportant, but ‘they play an active and significant role in the negotiations 
on the sociopolitical boundaries and rules of the game of a given political system’. Drawing 
on her research, Suri (2013) calls for more research on small parties in India both because 
they are interesting in their own right, but also because they shine a light on wider political 
processes and structures. Elsewhere (Gorringe 2017), I have elucidated the impact of the 
VCK on Tamil politics and society. This paper extends my analysis beyond the confines of 
the state to ask three inter-related questions: what were the attractions of national politics for 
the VCK? What did they gain (if anything) from Thirumavalavan’s time as an MP? And what 
is the legacy of his term as an MP? We begin, though, by contextualising these discussions by 
reference to recent literature on State-Centre relations in India. 
 
Centre-State Relations and Party Politics in India and Tamil Nadu 
As Wyatt notes in his introduction to this special issue, small parties often represent 
particular groups or interests and are capable of winning seats in the State Assembly and 
gaining a foothold in the Lok Sabha, but are not in a position to form a government even at 
the local level. Small parties in India, gained salience in the 1990s with the transformation of 
the Indian party system and the move away from single-party dominance (Suri 2013). Arora 
and Lama Rewal (2009) argue that the 1990s and 2000s witnessed a federalisation of the 
party system that has seen an increase in the number of single-state parties. Such parties as 
Palshikar (2004) notes, are not new, but they have acquired an all-India role in the coalition 
era. Yadav and Palshikar (2008) suggest that state-politics is increasingly autonomous from 
national politics and may be able ‘to determine the agenda of national politics or enjoy the 
upper-hand in their bargains with national parties’. Kailash (2009: 54) concurs that it is often 
‘coalition partners rather than coalition makers who call the shots when it comes to 
government formation and portfolio allocation’. Indeed, he shows how even parties with only 
one or two seats secured crucial portfolios and departments in the 1998 Bharatiya Janata 
Party-led National Democratic Alliance Government (ibid. 55). Likewise the Congress-led 
United Progressive Alliance in 2004 signed up (on paper at least) to a power sharing 
agreement in which a party would be allocated one ministerial berth for every three 
representatives (Kailash 2007: 312). As a result, Singh and Saxena (2011: 188) observe, 
central Government cabinets in coalition agreements may comprise multiple actors who are 
proposed and controlled by participating (State-level) parties.  Sridharan (2003: 146) details 
how state parties increasingly sought to ‘carve out a parliamentary position at the center’ as 
well as retaining state power. This, he argues, marks a shift in the balance of power from the 
centre to the states. The trend towards coalition politics was, of course, somewhat reversed at 
a national level in 2014 when the BJP, though part of the National Democratic Alliance 
coalition, won sufficient seats on its own to gain a majority. The narrow vote margins and the 
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failure of any polity wide parties to make significant inroads in states like Tamil Nadu, 
however, suggests that coalitions will continue to be important in future. 
 
Coalition rule has led to the rise of nested games played at multiple levels. State parties, 
Sridharan (2003: 141) points out, may seek to ‘trade assembly and parliamentary seats with 
the coalition’s dominant national party partner’. This was the rule until recently in Tamil 
Nadu. Two regional parties, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Dravidian Progressive 
Federation – DMK) and its offshoot the All India Anna DMK (AIADMK), have dominated 
Tamil politics since 1967 and only since 1998 has Tamil politics moved ‘from a two and a 
half party system to bi-polar multipartism’ (Wyatt, 2009, p. 1). This duopoly partly explains 
why opposition parties in the state have been unable to make the inroads that challengers 
such as the Bahujan Samaj Party have made in Uttar Pradesh. Although they dominate state 
politics, the Dravidian parties have routinely offered the Congress and BJP more seats in Lok 
Sabha elections than their local support justified, in exchange for the support of these parties 
as junior allies in state elections and for influence (including cabinet posts) at the centre 
(Kailash 2011). These games are always ‘nested’ in that calculations at state (the desire to 
retain or gain power), national (the aspiration for cabinet berths or resources) and regional 
level (disputes over river-water sharing for instance) may affect coalitions in multiple ways.2 
For instance, Wyatt (2015) suggests that the DMK rejected Congress in the run up to the 
2014 national elections, despite being in a weak position, because it had an eye on the 2016 
state elections and the Congress were perceived to be a toxic partner in Tamil politics.  
 
Kailash (2011) demonstrates how such games occur in the distribution of portfolios and 
ministerships too. State parties may seek to secure Ministerships that they can use to the 
advantage of their state, or they may prioritise their own status, prestige and resources. 
Decisions reflect their ‘varied territorial interests’ and depend whether they are in power or 
opposition at the State level (Kailash and Arora 2016: 63). Wyatt (2002: 737) notes how one 
of the AIADMK’s hopes in extending support to the BJP in 1998, was that it would topple 
the DMK Government in Tamil Nadu. When it became clear that this would not occur, the 
AIADMK withdrew support. The DMK promptly seized the chance to ally with the BJP, 
hoping to shore up its State government. McMillan (2014: 191) likewise notes how those in 
opposition in the state may prioritise local issues over national ones. He observes that the 
Telegu Desam Party offered outside support to the BJP in 1998, so that it could shape 
coalition politics but distance itself publicly from any unpopular policies. 
 
It is important to appreciate that the VCK is considerably smaller than some of the other 
parties discussed here. Following Kailash, the VCK are ‘bit players’ who ‘even in the best 
scenario is a coalitionable party at the state level’ (2011: 252). Problems for analysis arise 
here given the federalised nature of party systems in India. Wyatt (2009), thus, notes how the 
DMK/AIADMK have refused to form coalitions at the state level, compelling smaller players 
to try and compensate for this with gains at the national level. They have been seen as worthy 
alliance partners, but not included in governing coalitions (a point made strongly in the 
VCK’s 2016 election campaign). According to Sartori (2005: 108 emphasis in original) a 
‘minor party may be discounted as irrelevant whenever it remains over time superfluous’; 
exhibiting neither coalition nor ‘blackmail’ potential. Sartori describes blackmail potential as 
the ability to veto legislation or policy. Herzog (1987), however, challenges Sartori’s 
evaluation of party relevance noting how smaller parties may influence the political agenda 
by raising new issues and threatening to wean voters away from established parties. The 
VCK’s influence in this regard rests on their ability to represent (or claim to) Dalit or Eelam 
Tamil interests and to publicise and politicise issues. Significantly, the large national parties 
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have little purchase in Tamil Nadu and need local alliances to succeed (Chhibber and Murali 
2006). This affords minor parties the chance of entering national alliances as part of a 
Dravidian package or as a counter-weight to them. 
 
With few if any representatives, the party relies on extra-institutional protest to raise key 
demands. In this sense, the VCK remain a protest or ‘movement party’. Such parties, as 
Kitschelt (2006: 281) argues, follow a dual approach: ‘legislators of such parties may debate 
bills in parliamentary committees, but the next day, they participate in disruptive 
demonstrations’. Indeed, such organisations may use the profile afforded to them by elected 
representatives to gain publicity by disrupting parliament. Spary (2013: 393) insists that such 
‘legislative protest should not be dismissed as frivolous behaviour, or narrowly as self-
interested representatives “playing to the gallery”’. Indeed, she notes that the absence of 
conflict may render parliamentary institutions unrepresentative in the eyes of disgruntled 
citizens (2013: 398). Such disruptions may seek to alter the agenda, but also to ‘effectively 
signal to their constituents that they are representing their concerns’ (Spary 2013: 402). This 
latter function is served because ‘disruptions almost guarantee national and regional media 
coverage’ (Spary 2010: 348). At best such interventions may articulate alternatives and 
prompt debate, but at least they flag up the salience of particular issues. Given Wyatt’s (2009: 
128) observation that ‘there is an important performative aspect to [VCK] politics’, our 
analysis of the party in Delhi must be attuned to both formal and informal aspects of their 
engagement. 
 
Research Methods and Context 
At the time of writing in 2017, the VCK have no parliamentary representatives at state or 
national levels, but VCK leader Thirumavalavan served as an MP in Delhi between 2009 and 
2014 when the party were in alliance with the DMK and Congress. I spent over 10 months 
engaged in fieldwork on Dalit politics and institutionalisation in 2012, and visited Delhi to 
interview Thirumavalavan.3 The VCK’s engagement with national politics was not a key 
theme of the research, but it was central to their politics at this point. Party billboards and 
murals frequently placed the Lok Sabha in the backdrop, activists travelled to Delhi to see 
their leader, party speeches included reports of parliamentary interventions and all references 
to Thirumavalavan were suffixed with ‘M.P,’ testifying to the pride they felt in his elevation. 
The VCK, with one member, neither gained formal political recognition (this requires 2 MPs; 
Gorringe 2017: 130-131), nor a portfolio in government. Whilst the party seemingly had little 
relevancy, Herzog (1987: 317) insists that such organisations ‘play an active and significant 
role in the negotiation on the socio-political boundaries and rules of the game’. It is to an 
analysis of the interplay between this minor party and national politics that we now turn. 
 
Gaining Political Recognition 
Given the VCK’s marginal position, and the bi-polar nature of Tamil politics, the first step to 
gaining national representation was to forge an alliance with a larger state party. Things 
nearly floundered at this early stage. The year preceding the polls witnessed the height of the 
Sri Lankan conflict against the LTTE, and the death and suffering of Tamil civilians. In 2009, 
Thirumavalavan went on a ‘fast unto death’ to condemn the violence and urge the Indian 
government to intervene. This action gained him much credit in the state. According to one 
Tamil-nationalist VCK-member: 
 
[Thirumavalavan’s] reputation reached its peak when he sat for hunger strike in 
Maraimalainagar and announced that he was ready to die for LTTE, fighting for 
separate Tamil Eelam. Not only Dalits, even Backward Caste people who were LTTE 
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sympathisers, supported him at that time. Thousands of youth idolised him on par with 
Prabhakaran (Vivacayi, Interview, August 2012). 
 
Rather than supporting their junior ally, however, the DMK clamped down on the protests 
around the fast. They enforced a ban on the use of ‘Eelam’ in VCK posters – literally pasting 
over the term where it appeared, and sanctioned the arrest of party cadres when they took to 
the streets.4 Thirumavalavan (2009: 263) analysed the VCK’s electoral situation like this: 
 
Last January 12 [2009], PMK leader Ramadoss and Veeramani and Thirumavalavan [in 
the third-person] went to meet the DMK leader to call on him to raise his voice 
[withdraw his MPs from the Congress coalition]. When that meeting did not satisfy us, 
I launched a fast-unto-death. Though we were in alliance, the DMK fiercely arrested 
cadres: 360 people were arrested in Villupuram, Cuddalore, Nagapattinam, Ariyallur, 
Perambalur, Tiruchy, Vellore, Thiruvanamalai, Madurai and many other districts. Over 
200 were stuck in prison on non-bailable charges. 26 of those arrested were charged 
under the Goondas and NSA act and languished in prison for one year. 
 
This, obviously, problematized the alliance with the DMK, and the VCK called on Tamil 
nationalist groups like the PMK and Vaiko’s MDMK to unite. When that nationalist front 
failed to materialise, Thirumavalavan considered going it alone against the anti-LTTE 
Congress. The relevance of the VCK may be called into question here. The VCK are such 
small players that any ‘blackmail potential’ they might have had rested on their ability to 
persuade other parties to act with them. Indeed, one VCK sympathiser, questioned if the 
DMK: 
 
were blackmailing him [Thirumavalavan] at one point. Funding is an issue, but can it 
explain this? Thirumavalavan says too many cadres were held under NSA, Goondas, 
but this happened in alliance. What has the alliance done for them in terms of power? 
… what good did it do them? (Kavinar, Informal Interview, September 2012).  
 
Such was the feeling among supporters when, for want of a better option, the VCK remained 
in the DMK fold. The party faced accusations, and were attacked for opportunism and 
betrayal. The official line was that the party had tried all other options and were unwilling to 
contest alone since that would mean giving up on victory, contesting from only one seat 
(since they lack the resources to fight multiple contests) and risking violence. As VCK 
sympathiser – the author Meena Kandasamy (2009) put it in an open letter: 
 
Even if he takes up the challenge, can Thirumavalavan guarantee the safety of his 
cadres and VCK members? What happened on the two previous occasions when he 
contested independently in Chidambaram. 25,000 huts were burnt. 400 Dalit 
settlements were prevented from coming to the polling booth, several young men died 
or lost their limbs. Who will stand by the VCK when casteist violence runs riot? 
 
Although bitterly disappointed by the decision, Vivacayi – cited above – accepted the 
decision and saw the logic in the move:  
 
Either Vaiko or Ramadoss didn’t take this attempt. He (Thirumavalavan) took this 
attempt and it didn’t succeed. So what is the next step – to fight alone? You know, erm, 
if you do that, they [mainstream political parties] will easily side-line the party based on 
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weaker sections. If we want to boost the confidence of the marginalised section then we 
have to get MLA’s and MP’s from the community (Interview, August 2012). 
 
If this explains why the VCK took this unpopular move, it is worth asking why they were 
accepted into the alliance. As, Kandasamy (2009) argued: ‘The DMK did not send him out 
despite the protestations of the Congress. Even the Congress had to climb down from its 
earlier stance’. This point highlights Kailash’s (2011) argument about the complexities faced 
by polity-wide parties. When the central Congress leadership was compelled to accept the 
VCK as part of the DMK package, the state-level Congress were outraged. Muruganandham 
(2009) reported that ‘Karunanidhi’s assertion that VCK would be part of the UPA in Tamil 
Nadu has infuriated the Congress Functionaries. Senior Congress figures from Vellore 
demanded Thirumavalavan’s arrest under NSA for remarks against the sovereignty of the 
country’, recalling that he vowed to root Congress out of Tamil Nadu and glorified the killing 
of Rajiv. The Indian Express wrote of a Congress worker in Chennai who had signed a 
memorandum with her blood demanding the suspension of the VCK from the UPA.5 Merely 
getting into the alliance, thus, was a victory in terms of political recognition for the VCK, a 
nod by the DMK towards strength of feeling on the Sri Lankan conflict, and a reminder of the 
weak position of Congress in Tamil Nadu. 
 
A place on the world stage 
Kailash notes how secret negotiations underpin coalitions. ‘In federal states, he argues, 
payoffs are not restricted to one level and could involve side payments at other levels. 
Evidences of such agreements’ he says, ‘are generally visible only when breached’ (2007: 
308). In keeping with this, the terms of the agreements between the DMK, Congress and 
VCK were unclear. During the campaign, when they shared a stage, it appeared that one 
condition was uncritical support. A disgusted VCK member, insisted that: ‘no Tamil 
Nationalist would accept his eulogy of Sonia Gandhi. … He shouldn’t have said ‘long live 
Sonia Gandhi’’ (TamizhMurasu Interview, September 2012). The agreement clearly they did 
not include a blanket gagging clause, though, since Thirumavalavan was vociferous in 
criticising both allies at various points. Despite deep differences, however, he did not 
withdraw support to the UPA or resign as an MP – an act which may have pressured the 
DMK to justify its continued support for Congress. 
 
For its part, the VCK gained campaign finances and support which enabled Thirumavalavan 
to secure election to the centre. One of the key attractions of standing in Lok Sabha elections, 
we have seen, was the lack of opportunities at state level. Given that the VCK contested as 
part of the DMK alliance, however, and was vehemently opposed by Tamil Congress 
workers, the chances of a Ministership or portfolio were remote. Furthermore, becoming an 
MP took the central figure of the VCK away from the state for extended periods leaving the 
party rudderless at times (though he often missed parliament). What, then, did the party stand 
to gain? One of the most powerful pull factors has been flagged up already: a central concern 
of the VCK at this point was the conflict in Sri Lanka, which relates to national rather than 
state policy. In becoming an MP, Thirumavalavan could raise these issues in Parliament and 
secure greater coverage for the issues and his party. 
 
In his maiden speech, Thirumavalavan (2015; Lok Sabha 2009a) urged the Indian 
Government to bring out a white paper on the genocide of Sri Lankan Tamils, change its 
‘anti-Tamil attitude’, and sought to know the role of the Union Government on Sri Lankan 
issues and what support was extended to the Sri Lankan government. He said: ‘Our party and 
our allied parties are very much concerned about Sri Lankan issues. I am sorry to say the 
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Government of India betrayed the Tamil community in Sri Lanka’. His stance on these issues 
led to him being included as part of a delegation of Tamil MPs who visited refugee camps in 
Sri Lanka. This only occurred due to the alliance, as he told TamilNet (2009): 
 
In the third week of September, a group of M.Ps from the ruling parties called on the 
Prime Minister and placed this demand to visit the camps in Sri Lanka, so these 
arrangements were carried out. This was not an authorized selection of a Parliamentary 
Delegation by the Government of India. I feel that the absence of the opposition parties 
from this delegation is certainly a drawback. 
 
Thirumavalavan’s interview with TamilNet depicted him as a leading supporter of Eelam, 
helping the VCK grow beyond their characterisation as a ‘Dalit party’. Partly on the back of 
his increased profile, Thirumavalavan was invited to address audiences worldwide including 
in Dubai, UK, Canada, Singapore and Malaysia. His status as an MP also lent weight to his 
demands about water sharing arrangements between Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu 
which are resolved at the Centre. Finally, he was able to raise concerns about untouchability 
and reservations that again relate to central government legislation. If there is a logic to 
protesting at the seat of power, this is amplified by the increased coverage he received as an 
MP. Care was taken to report back to supporters at home: News of his parliamentary 
interventions and trips were covered in the party magazine, featured in his speeches in Tamil 
Nadu, and were later published as a volume called ‘Kadaisi Mannithan Kural (The voice of 
the last and least)’. Numerous respondents insisted that he had ‘raised his voice’ for them. 
Munniamma from Kodankipatti was typical. She responded spiritedly when asked what the 
party had achieved: ‘Not much – they are a small outfit with just one MP what do you expect 
them to do? They need to give us a voice and raise our issues and try and get political power 
– this is what they are doing’ (Fieldnotes, June 2012). 
 
Material Benefits 
Whilst symbolic gains and agenda change are vital for small parties, participation in national 
politics has other attractions. Being an MP provides – in Wyatt’s (2009: 89) words – ‘the 
satisfaction gained from office holding and the opportunities for financial gain from office 
holding’. The latter is an essential ingredient for parties and candidates’, which ‘are forced to 
mobilize huge resources to meet election-related expenditure’ (Suri 2013: 245). An 
imbalance in resources can reinforce smaller parties’ dependence on established players. 
Minor parties in an alliance may have their electoral campaign bankrolled by the dominant 
partner. Reflecting on the options open to the VCK, state leader ArtralArasu highlighted this: 
 
A: At least if we have some money, let's say 50 crores, then we can demand some seats 
from our alliance partners. We can boldly ask 20 seats and say that we would bear our 
electoral expenses on our own. 
Q: Now, are they giving you money? 
A: Yes, they do. They think giving more seats means they have to spend more money. 
You asked about seats – why didn't we demand more seats. … They feel giving more 
seats to us is a burden because on top of everything they have to spend more money. If 
we raise funds from people like this, not from ordinary people, from party functionaries, 
from industrialists, then we would become self-sufficient (Interview, July 2012). 
 
As Gowda and Sridharan (2012: 235) note: ‘Given the magnitude of resources that political 
parties need to raise for campaigns, they can be expected to prefer candidates who can raise 
resources for the party and finance their own campaigns’. Sure enough, Thirumavalavan told 
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a gathering of party workers applying for posts that resources were one criteria: ‘we also need 
people with means to help finance campaigns and so on’ (Speech 28 April 2012). There was 
widespread discontent in the party that people with means gained rapid promotion, but 
candidates chosen for their contribution often lacked the means to compete. In the 2016 state 
elections, for example, one candidate – Aloor Shanavas - sought to crowd-fund his campaign 
(Ganesan 2016). The party still relies on others for funds, however, and one of the two VCK 
candidates standing for election in 2009 was a DMK sympathiser who was foisted onto the 
VCK by their ally (Gorringe 2017: 133). Gaining an MP was, therefore, welcomed as an 
opportunity to place the party on a more stable financial footing.6  
 
At the very least, the post brings a salary and dedicated MP funds to spend in the 
constituency. Chandra (2004) refers to India as a ‘patronage democracy’ in which elected 
representatives ‘enjoy significant discretion in the implementation of laws allocating jobs and 
services at the disposal of the state’ (Suri 2013: 243; Wyatt 2013). MP resources may be used 
to build a reputation in the constituency, buttress the party or enrich the incumbent. 
Thirumavalavan did spend the vast majority of his MP Local Area Development Scheme 
funds (amounting to 19 Crore during his time in office)7, but by his own admission in a media 
interview he failed to deliver on most key campaign pledges (Puthiya Thalamurai 2014). In 
line with this self-assessment, the Tamil magazine Junior Vikatan reported that 
Thirumavalavan seldom visited and did not have an office there, failed to heed constituents’ 
demands, and did not deliver any big schemes (Prabhu 2013). They cited a poll showing that 
55% of voters felt that he had not fulfilled his campaign pledges. A senior leader in the VCK 
admitted that not enough had been done in the constituency:  
 
The 2014 parliamentary election is approaching now. The leader is busy with 
parliament and other work. So naturally people like us should concentrate on his 
constituency. But, there is no such system in place in the party to encourage that 
(Thalaivar, Interview, August 2012). 
 
Conflicting with this Sannah, the propaganda secretary, argued that: 
 
in Chidamambaram MP constituency the VCK has a huge team to decide what work 
needs to be done and what needs to happen. That group finds out what places have what 
issues and draws up a list noting where roads need to be laid, where tanks need to be 
built, where social centres and libraries are required, where schools are needed, they 
note all these issues in a list and then allocate funds accordingly (Interview, September 
2012). 
 
Thirumavalavan likewise rebutted the criticisms voiced in Junior Vikatan and listed his 
achievements and projects in Chidambaram. Critically, he highlighted the resources available 
to an MP in noting that he received 60 lakhs from corporate finance (Prabhu 2013) on top of 
his parliamentary fund. This fund was increased during Thirumavalavan’s tenure from ‘Rs.2 
crores to Rs.5 crores per annum per Member of Parliament from 2011-12 onwards’ and ... 
‘the MP can suggest works in one or more districts within the State from which he is elected’ 
(Government of India 2011: 103). Given the way Tamil politics works (Wyatt 2013; Gorringe 
2017) this will have enabled the party to gain some followers and recoup some money from 
commissions paid by contractors to smooth things along. As Wyatt (2013: 37) notes, 
however, ‘junior allies cannot hope to compete with the resources available to office holding 
parties’, and small parties are also dependent on the popularity of their dominant partners. 
Indeed, in interviews, Thirumavalavan highlights how several big schemes – a women’s 
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college and a major subway to help construction workers – were hampered by a lack of 
assistance from state or central government in matching funds or securing the necessary land 
(Puthiya Thalamurai 2014; Thinna Thanthi 2014). Whilst he emphasises that he distributed 
more funds to villages than previous incumbents, there is little suggestion that his tenure was 
especially beneficial to Dalits except insofar as his position in an alliance afforded them 
greater access to patronage (Gorringe 2017). 
 
One arena in which being a small outfit is beneficial was highlighted during my trip to Delhi. 
Thirumavalavan was due to address the Tamil Sangam (Union) and when I asked why they 
had invited him he said that people approached him because they would get a speedy 
response: he did not need to go and ask a party leader if such an engagement was acceptable 
or not (Personal Communication, August 2012). As party leader, however, he was expected 
to travel widely and – in the absence of established secondary leaders and party infrastructure 
- this led to disgruntled constituents. Some of Thirumavalavan’s travels arose from his 
parliamentary duties. He formed part of delegations sent to Estonia and Sri Lanka, and was a 
member of Standing Committees on Commerce and Petroleum & Natural Gas as well as the 
Consultative Committee for the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment.8 Such 
committees allow MPs to have a say and increase their allowances. VCK General Secretary 
Ravikumar observed that Thirumavalavan used his role in the Commerce Committee to 
‘resolve many issues of SC/ST employees including promotion, and wage settlement in the 
industry’ (Personal Communication, January 2016). There may well have been other benefits 
– the Commerce Committee at this time discussed the performance of the cement industry in 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala – which will have increased Thirumavalavan’s 
standing and attractiveness as a contact. Thirumavalavan’s tenure as an MP, however, was 
not defined by such routine parliamentary activities.  
 
Performing on the National Stage 
It is notable that many of the Lok Sabha debates where Thirumavalavan is mentioned contain 
his name next to the statement ‘is on the floor of the house’ or ‘walked out’.9 Thirumavalavan 
was also a frequent visitor to the Gandhi statue, habitual site of parliamentary protests, where 
he was pictured holding placards with demands and slogans. Discussions of political 
bargaining in the middle game fail to capture these more affective, emotive and symbolic 
aspects of political engagement (cf. Spary 2010). Indeed, one speaker at the annual memorial 
of the Melavalavu massacre in 2012 (a key point in the VCK calendar)10, felt that 
Thirumavalavan had already justified his election in disrupting Parliament to protest about 
the inclusion of a cartoon of Ambedkar in school textbooks: ‘This is the Dalit leader who 
brought Parliament to a halt for the dishonour inflicted on Ambedkar [greeted with huge 
cheers]. This one act is enough to justify his five year term! (Speech at Melavalavu, June 
2012).11 Thirumavalavan’s desk-thumping, impassioned performance was played repeatedly 
on TV screens in Tamil Nadu, and was welcomed by my Dalit respondents as contesting 
caste norms and defending their icon. 
 
Whilst most of Thirumavalavan’s public protests concerned the Sri Lankan war – an issue 
flagged up in the Junior Vikatan report - he was keen show his core Dalit support that he was 
representing their concerns. Apart from the cartoon, one issue highlighted at party events in 
2012, was his repeated raising of manual scavenging in Indian railways. In one of his 
Parliamentary interventions Thirumavalavan insisted that: ‘Even in the 21st Century in our 
country, the scavengers of Railways are cleaning the nightsoils of human beings 
manually. Really, it is a great insult to the nation’ (Lok Sabha 2009b). This stance was 
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relayed to supporters in speeches in Tamil Nadu to emphasise his continuing commitment to 
Dalits. At a wedding speech in Muduvarpatti, for example, he explained his role: 
 
Mind you, being in Parliament is like being in school sometimes – I have to sit quiet 
and do nothing. I do not even understand the language. Still, it is my duty to go there 
and represent the people who put faith in me. The downtrodden sent me to Delhi and so 
I am duty bound to raise my voice for them. When the railway budget was discussed I 
was the only person to raise the issue of an abiding national shame. Ours is the only 
country in the world where people still clear faeces with their hands. Unlike in any 
other country here the waste from the toilets goes straight onto the track. … I raised this 
issue forcefully for consideration and, when I got no satisfactory response, I was the 
only MP to walk out in protest (Speech, May 2012). 
 
Parliamentary disruption, as Spary (2013: 402) argues, may be used ‘to more effectively 
signal to their constituents that they are representing their concerns’. Thirumavalavan here is 
seeking to reconnect to the Tamil masses. He notes the difficulty of operating in a strange – 
almost foreign environment – and emphasises the problematic and unacceptable nature of the 
status quo. The expectations and outcomes of small, protest parties, this reminds us, cannot 
be measured alongside those of dominant players. VCK post-holder Selva Arasu spelled out 
what they hoped to achieve from having an M.P: 
 
S: In a democratic country you can go to Parliament and raise the issues of the 
downtrodden. We can do that. Though we can’t do much, though we are not a big party 
and do not get opportunities we have the chance to raise issues. We can go to the centre 
of political power and raise issues or protest and prevent them from functioning. We 
can do this. Since there is only a lone representative, however, we do not get many 
chances to speak. We do not get too much respect. Still the leader does his best. Even in 
the recent Sri Lankan issue. Thirumavalavan advanced the demand for the government 
to back the US resolution by holding up placards with this message and staging protests 
by the Gandhi statue as a lone member … 
A: And because he is an MP this gets coverage?  
S: Yes. This is an avenue through which to raise people’s issues (Interview, April 
2012). 
 
In an echo of Herzog’s (1987) defence of small parties, VCK leader UnchaiArasan similarly 
pointed to the wider value of Thirumavalavan’s time in office: ‘Beyond electoral victory, see, 
we have to think how much change and uprising has occurred in our society, people like us 
think like that ... what is important is that it has created awareness among people’ (Interview, 
August 2012). Such interventions gained the VCK few political friends in Delhi and no 
material resources, but may have helped persuade supporters that the VCK was still worth 
supporting. Indeed, though the VCK lost both seats in 2014, they secured a large share of the 
vote in both Chidambaram and Tiruvallur where they stood. Despite this, as of 2014 the party 
has no parliamentary representatives. This reminds us that resources and kudos to be gained 
from engaging in national politics, may come at a price in terms of principles and support. 
 
Tainting: The Risks of National Alliances 
Whilst, as we have seen, there was dissatisfaction amongst the constituents of Chidambaram 
(Prabhu 2013) and a sense in the party that that the VCK had not done enough to shore up 
support in the constituency (Thalaivar interview above), most internal analyses of electoral 
performances emphasised the importance of alliances for small parties. As Artralarasu put it: 
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‘We lose elections because of people's dissatisfaction with the party who leads the alliance’ 
(Interview, July 2012). Though the VCK have reached out to a broader vote-base with their 
emphasis on Tamil nationalism, their core support-base continues to be made up of Dalit 
voters. In no constituency are their supporters in sufficient numbers to win alone and so they 
are, to large extent, dependent on their allies. One thing such alliances with a small Dalit-led 
party highlight are the persistence of caste identities and attitudes as seen in the reluctance of 
alliance partners to wholeheartedly endorse or vote for the VCK (Gorringe 2017). Even if 
they are not fully accepted and incorporated, however, smaller parties’ accommodation in 
larger coalitions can, as McMillan (2014: 192) notes, lead to ‘tainting’. Sure enough, the 
VCK were accused of ‘suitcase’ (corrupt and unprincipled) politics and of selling out on both 
Dalit and Tamil issues. In a group discussion with VCK activists in Pudhukottai district they 
bitterly commented that: ‘The VCK has abandoned the Dalit issue for the Sri Lankan cause, 
and has also abandoned that: There are neither one thing nor the other. They have sold out on 
both (Ambalapadutheetanga) (Fieldnotes, July 2012). A critical non-political Dalit activist 
captured a common theme in arguing that:  
 
If you ask what is happening now, Dalit parties whether it be the VCK or Puthiya 
Tamizhgam are washing their hands of the Dalit issue and reaching out for the Tamil 
cause. Purely for the vote-bank. The reason they are where they are is the Dalit cause, 
but they are hollering about the problems in Eelam (Arvalar, Interview March 2012). 
 
Thirumavalavan (2009: 26) rightly points out that ‘there is no [recognised] party in Tamil 
Nadu that can be pointed to as a true friend of the Dalits. In this situation can we avoid all 
these parties?’ There is an appreciation of this amongst cadre and so the issue of tainting 
arose mainly around Tamil nationalism. TamilNet (2012) reported how: 
 
Thirumavalavan, meeting UPA leader Mrs Sonia Gandhi on Wednesday expressed his 
‘appreciation’ about New Delhi’s stand on ‘Sri Lankan Tamils’ at the UNHRC 
resolution, and requested her to implement it and pressurise the Sri Lankan government 
to find a permanent political solution. The moment Thirumavalavan uses the phrase ‘Sri 
Lankan Tamils’ and thrust an identity despised by Eezham (Eelam) Tamils on to them, 
he perverts righteous political solution, commented Tamil political circles in the island. 
Rather than urging recognition of rights of the nation, the VCK leader pleading Sonia 
Gandhi, whose party presided over the genocide of Eezham Tamils, to implement 
UNHRC resolutions paving way for structural genocide, makes him no different from 
the Congress and CPI-M, they further said. 
 
In her passionate defence of the VCK decision, Kandasamy (2009) argued that: ‘I am sure 
Thiruma’s pro-Tiger stand will be intact irrespective of his alliance with the DMK-Congress. 
What he has done is not opportunism. This is the only option that was available to him’. In 
his MP residence in Delhi, Thirumavalavan conceded that not leaving the ‘DMK during the 
Mullivaikal massacre – that was the biggest blunder; leaving now would make me the biggest 
of opportunists. Leaving then seemed tricky because we would have been isolated’ (Personal 
Communication, August 2012). Even if this is accepted other criticised his actions in office, 
including the decision to shake hands with Sri Lankan President Rajapakshe during a 
deputation to the country. The significance of this event was captured in a VCK event to 
launch a new website, where all the speakers felt compelled to address the issue and justify 
Thirumavalavan’s actions (Gorringe 2017: 317). They insisted that the criticism was unfair 
and that the VCK were being compelled to carry the can for the failure of others to stand 
firm. The cartoonist Bala captured this sentiment admirably and showed that it was more 
12 
 
widely shared in a sketch showing Thirumavalavan trailing behind Karunanidhi and being 
forced to bear the weight of ‘Karuna’s Eelam betrayals’.12  
 
The federal calculations of this small party clearly back-fired upon them in this regard. 
AzhaguMurugan from a village near Allangannallur, for example, insisted that he had left the 
VCK when they backed Congress and joined Naam Tamizhar Katchi (We Tamils Party). He, 
like many experienced the decision to ally with Congress as a betrayal (Fieldnotes, June 
2012). ‘The association with unpopular policies’, as McMillan (2014: 192) argues, ‘can harm 
future electoral performance’. Concerns over, what he calls, ‘tainting’ by association also 
affects alliance calculations and decisions, and having been shabbily treated in the 2014 
elections, the VCK adopted a different approach for the state polls in 2016. They forged a 
new front, called the People’s Welfare Front (PWF), composed of smaller, non-Dravidian 
parties in a bid to reclaim some integrity by campaigning against casteism, communalism and 
corruption. Crucially, recognising that they attract opprobrium for their choices but gain little 
power by way of compensation, Thirumavalavan spelled out the central plank of the 
campaign: ‘“We have contested with both the DMK in 2014 and the AIADMK in the past,” 
the VCK chief says. “But this time, we want to present a new proposal to the people of Tamil 
Nadu. All of the problems of our current political system - corruption especially - can only be 
solved with a coalition form of government”’ (Iyer 2016). The PWF highlighted both the 
reasons that national elections were so attractive to the VCK - in that they gain no power at 
the state level, and the difficulties for small parties in contesting against dominant 
organisations - in that they failed to win a single seat. In light of this, alliance politics is likely 
to be back on the cards in future elections. 
 
Small Parties in Federal Politics 
This study of a neglected feature of federal politics – the place of small parties in the system 
– echoes Herzog’s (1987) conclusion that minor parties are important indicators of the rules 
and parameters of a political system. Although the VCK are a minor party, largely confined 
to pockets of influence in one state, the election of their leader as an M.P demonstrated that 
they can still harbour national ambitions. It is clear that federal institutions offer options for 
small parties to gain resources and increase their profile, especially in a context where state 
politics are not open or participatory and coalitions are ruled out (cf. Wyatt 2015). The 
VCK’s engagement with national politics also offers insights into the workings of federal 
politics. It became apparent, that polity-wide parties constrain their state units and that the 
two levels of National parties are not always in step (cf. Kailash 2011). Tamil Nadu State 
Congress members were appalled by the inclusion of the VCK – who were accommodated so 
as not to alienate the DMK. As the Congress has little purchase in the state, local leaders are 
often over-ruled in attempts to forge electoral alliances. Small parties, thus, may offer 
national parties a toe-hold in states dominated by regional groups.13 Insofar as the VCK had 
any ‘blackmail potential’ it lay here, in that its exclusion by the DMK may have further 
diluted the DMK’s already weak claims to stand up for Eelam Tamils and Dalits and 
increased the discomfort occasioned by the alliance with the Congress Party.  
 
Herzog’s scepticism about Sartori’s notion of ‘relevance’ is echoed here. Clearly the VCK 
remain a minor political party in terms of electoral performance, but they have succeeded in 
placing key issues on the political agenda. Whilst much of the emphasis during 
Thirumavalavan’s tenure was on ‘Tamil’ issues, the party was instrumental in getting the 
Special Component Plan funds – set aside for Scheduled Castes – allocated properly, in 
raising the issue of land reform and in highlighting caste atrocities and alcohol abuse 
(Gorringe 2017). In this sense, Herzog (1987: 327) rightly argues that small parties illuminate 
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the boundaries and limits of a political culture and constitute ‘channels for expressions of 
grievance and protest’. This highlights the fact that, for all the focus on agreements and 
resources, there are significant affective and status gains for MPs: they have a higher profile 
and standing for a start, and may use disruptive tactics to signal commitment to a cause or 
highlight neglected issues (cf. Spary 2013). To gain access to the Lok Sabha, however, minor 
parties like the VCK usually depend on alliances with more dominant partners and this comes 
with a risk of tainting in a context where small parties do not get full access to power. It is for 
this reason that the VCK raised the demand for coalition rather than alliance-based fronts. As 
Thirumavalavan insisted in 2016: 
 
‘The DMK or the AIADMK will not give us more than 10 seats in the alliance. We 
cannot evolve or empower our people. The only option now is to be part of a coalition 
government. If you look at the past, we got eight seats, then nine seats and finally 10 
seats when we were in alliance with either of the Dravidian parties. In 10 years we have 
been able to increase by only two seats. It is now time to propose a coalition 
government and we need to be part of the cabinet. We need power-sharing for 
marginalised sections’ (Economic Times 2016). 
 
If, following Kailash (2007), we view coalition agreements as a learning process, we are 
perhaps better placed to understand why the VCK - having been deeply disappointed by the 
DMK alliance – co-formed the People’s Welfare Front in 2016 attempting to recover their 
radicalism and retain their supporters, and indicating how minor parties can potentially 
influence the shape of party systems. That alliance was for the State elections, but in closing 
it is important to recognise that party positions are influenced by the electoral cycle. As 
Kailash and Arora (2016: 69) argue, the multi-level nature of India’s federal party structure 
means that party choices are constantly in flux due to different timelines, deadlines and 
events, and so ‘(p)arty choices at one level are not necessarily guided by factors at the level at 
which they implement their choice’. With the VCK’s foray we have seen this dynamic in 
play: engaging in national politics was fuelled by the lack of opportunities at state level, the 
desire to raise supra-national issues pertaining to the Sri Lankan conflict, and the pan-Indian 
possibilities offered by the Dalit label. Conversely the 2016 coalition articulated an anti-
communal agenda, pitching themselves against the national BJP which has negligible 
political standing in the state. In both cases, this most minor of parties highlighted significant 
exclusions and elisions in political programmes and used the electoral opportunities offered 
by the multi-level federal structure to challenge ‘dominant institutional scripts’ (Spary 2013: 
399). With the dissolution of the PWF in 2017, the path is now clear for further rounds of 
alliance formation and discussion. In light of the argument presented here, we can await these 
developments with interest. 
 
Notes 
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Andrew Wyatt for encouraging me to write the paper and for detailed discussions and comments. Finally, I am 
grateful to the two anonymous reviewers of the paper for their informed and constructive comments. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
1 Thirumavalavan puts the membership of the party at over 400,000 in 2012, but membership forms had not 
always been properly completed and cards had not been properly issued. Having entered parliamentary politics 
in 1999 they have stood candidates (albeit unsuccessfully) in every election since. They have fielded 25 
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candidates at most for state elections in 2016 (winning none) and 2 candidates for Lok Sabha Elections (in 2009 
and 2014). 
2 This became a campaign issue for the VCK after Thirumavalavan’s term as an MP and they launched a State’s 
Autonomy Conference to raise the issues of State-Centre relations. For details see here: 
http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2017/sep/22/cant-even-fulfil-poll-promises-due-to-centres-
squeeze-kerala-cm-pinarayi-vijayan-1660957--1.html (Accessed 18/05/2018). 
3 This was funded by an ESRC Grant (RES-062-23-3348), for full details see Gorringe (2017). Names of 
respondents have been anonymised where desired. 
4 See the story here: TamilNet 2009. ‘Tamil Nadu government erases the word 'Eezham'’, TamilNet 17 August 
2009 (Accessed 08/03/2016): http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=30027 
5 Small news item from Indian Express 20 March 2009 retrieved from the Dalit Resource Centre (DRC) archive 
in Madurai. 
6 As Michael Collins (2014) observes in his detailed ethnographic account of a VCK candidate’s campaign: 
‘While concerted efforts by the [Electoral] Commission have, in fact, dampened a candidate’s ability to spend 
freely, a limited focus on candidates without concurrent efforts to limit party expenditure is rechanneling 
campaign finance through the coffers of political parties and, in effect, leaving intact the primary source of 
exorbitant spending’. 
7 See the Ministry of Statistics report here: 
http://www.mplads.gov.in/MPLADS/UploadedFiles/HTML/15ls/lsstat22.htm (Accessed 18/05/2018). 
8 Details of these committees may be found here (Retrieved 20/07/2017): 
http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Committee/CommitteeInformation.aspx?comm_code=23&tab=1  
9 See details here (Retrieved 20/07/2017): 
http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/DebMembersearch_archive.aspx  
10 The Melavalavu massacre refers to the murder of the village Panchayat President Murugesan and six of his 
followers in 1997. The VCK was instrumental in bringing the case to public attention (see Gorringe 2005 for 
more details). 
11 For more on the cartoon controversy see Wankhede (2012). 
12 See the cartoon, from July 2012, here: http://tamilmakkalkural.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/karuna-in-teso-drama-
bala-cartoon.html (Accessed 24/08/2017). 
13 This was highlighted in BJP efforts to gain access to Tamil politics by allying with a range of smaller parties 
in 2014 (Wyatt 2015), 2016 and after the death of Jayalalithaa (Gorringe and Karthikeyan 2016). 
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